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A stream of fuzzy walky-talky noise and intermittent alarms welcomes me 
to the Guardia Civil’s control room above the border crossing point at El 
Tarajal, Ceuta. Despite the location, the guards’ attention inside the room 
is not fixed on the multitude of cars and pedestrians queuing to gain 
access to the Spanish principality from the nearby Moroccan countryside. 
Instead, their focus is on the five mile stretch of double border fencing 
which separates the enclave from Morocco, as well as on the ships 
travelling through the Strait of Gibraltar and the fishing vessels in Fnideq 
bay. I have come here predominantly to see Spain’s SIVE (Sistema Integrado 
de Vigilancia del Exterior) surveillance system, a complex assemblage of 
radar technology, high-tech cameras, vessel AIS1 and border guards in 
action. SIVE is designed to give the Guardia Civil constant ‘real time’ 
surveillance capabilities over Spain’s territorial waters and borders (Guardia 
Civil 2008). It has also largely been credited for the ‘successful’ shift in 
boat migration away from Spain (Guardia Civil 2008) and was used by 
Frontex as the blueprint for its EUROSUR surveillance system (Andersson 
2014; Godeneau 2014; López-Sala 2015).  
In the control room, SIVE is being operated by Juan,2 a young, bespectacled 
border guard sitting at the quieter end of the room, his eyes focused on 
a computer monitor showing a radar image of the marine area surrounding 
Ceuta. “I’d like to give you a full demonstration of the system,” he says 
motioning to a blank computer screen, “but today they are installing a new 
software system for the camera, so only the radar is operational right now.” 
Nevertheless, Juan takes me through the SIVE system and how it is 
employed in Ceuta. Returning to the radar monitor, Juan points to the 
various yellow lines that criss-cross across the screen: “We call these the 
‘Tracks’,” he continues, “they represent the current location of a vessel and 
how far it has travelled during the last five minutes.” The border guards 
use the radar system to look for vessels with ‘suspicious’ Tracks and then 
obtain an optical image of the vessel using the camera. 
On the noisier side of the room sits another border guard, noticeably busier 
than Juan, speedily operating an array of buttons and joy sticks in front 
of another bank of monitors. Standing behind him is his supervisor, dressed 
in civilian clothes, who appears to have been called in on his day-off. “It’s 
very windy today”, explains the supervisor, “it’s tripping all the sensors 
along the fence. And on top of that, today the gardeners are also clearing 
the area in front of it!” At the sound of each alarm, the guard punches 
the button that operates the camera nearest the tripped sensor and pans 
the area searching for what might have been the cause. Upon spotting a 
gardener he deactivates the alarm. Other times he waits to see if it might 
have been more than a gardener or the wind, occasionally he directs 
guards along the fence to check a specific area where he is uncertain. 
Meanwhile, the walkie-talkie chatter coming back from the guards at the 
fence confirms the lack of suspicious activity at each alarm site. “We have 
to move fast”, says the supervisor with one eye still focused on the 
screens, “the fences only slow them down. We need to get to them before 
they make it across.” 
*** 
12pm on a hillside overlooking both the harbour and the border fence 
between Ceuta and Morocco. While the fence might be brightly lit, the rest 
of the landscape is pitch black. I’m sitting inside what I had at first thought 
was an abandoned Volkswagen people carrier, but which later transpired to 
be one of the Guardia Civil’s night patrol units, complete with a mounted 
infrared camera. Called ‘búhos’ (Spanish for owl), three units are located 
in stationary positions at key vantage points along the fence. The main 
task for the guards of the búhos is to monitor the Moroccan side of the 
border for migrants hoping to climb the fence. Their other task, however, 
is to support the SIVE system by detecting small migrant boats (called 
‘pateras’) – especially in the area of Benzú on the Western coast of Ceuta 
where there is no radar coverage. A minimum of two more units (it 
transpires that the men from the third unit are on holiday) are equipped 
with less-powerful, handheld thermal cameras and flashlights. These secondary 
mobile units act as fast-response units whose main task is to track groups 
of migrants that have been spotted by the larger cameras and to point 
out their location to the Moroccan guards on the opposite side.  
I watch as Miguel, the guard currently on duty in the stationary unit, uses 
his joystick to pan around the vast area that he has been tasked with 
patrolling. Staring at the bright screen which inverses black with white, one 
can almost forget the darkness outside the Volkswagen. Despite the artificial 
brightness of the world on the computer screen, however, objects that would 
easily be discernible with the naked eye during the day take on a fuzzy 
form through the camera lens at night. To an untrained eye like mine the 
entire landscape appears utterly strange. Suddenly Miguel spots movement 
in the top-right corner of the screen. By using the camera’s telescopic 
zoom he attempts to get a clearer picture of what has alarmed him. Miguel 
clicks his tongue and points towards a small fuzzy form on the screen. 
“Just a Moroccan guard on patrol,” he says, zooming out and resuming 
his video-game like surveillance. 
*** 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This article builds on the ‘practice turn’ in border studies by critically 
engaging assemblage theory as a means of ‘unboxing’ European maritime 
surveillance. As the opening narratives suggest, maritime border security is 
dependent on an array of objects, bodies, materials and cultures that must 
consistently work together if the systems that produce border surveillance 
are to hold their shape. My aim is to put assemblage theory to work in 
order to foreground the messiness of producing (in)security such that a 
more productive account of the everyday geopolitics of the border can be 
made visible. Central to this account are the untidy alliances on which 
security systems are based, the multiplicity of the assemblages involved, 
and the “rhythmic turbulence of the material world” (Steinberg and Peters 
2015, 248). By focusing on the ways in which border guards ‘see’ and act 
upon the volatile borderspace through various surveillance technologies, the 
article seeks out the limits of the state’s surveillant powers and the ‘cracks’ 
within its socio-technical systems of control. 
Specifically, my focus is on ‘un-boxing’ Spain’s SIVE maritime surveillance 
system: a complex assemblage of radar technology, high-tech thermal 
cameras, vessel automatic identification systems (AIS) and border guards. 
Described by the Guardia Civil as an “early detection system giving the 
possibility of transmitting, in real time” (Guardia Civil 2008, 17), SIVE was 
developed in order to modernise the Guardia Civil’s previous methods of 
coastal surveillance, which were “based on the masse use of persons” and 
deemed insufficient for protecting the Spanish coast (Guardia Civil 2008, 
29). The initial SIVE design was aimed primarily at tackling smuggler gangs, 
who were using speedboats to dump drugs on the Spanish coast. As a 
result the system was designed specifically to detect small vessels travelling 
at fast speeds, regardless of the weather conditions (see Figure 1).  
Following the increase of sub-Saharan migrants attempting to reach Europe 
via Spain in the early 2000s, however, the Guardia Civil altered the stated 
aims of SIVE to include the detection and search & rescue of small 
migrant boats (known as pateras) (Guardia Civil 2008). As a result of 
increasing SIVE’s scope, moreover, the Guardia Civil received over €53 
million from the EU External Borders Fund between 2007 and 2013 in 
order to expand the SIVE network along the Spanish coast to help meet 
its “responsibilities in the control of the external borders [of the EU]” – thus 
bringing total investment in the system to over two hundred million euros 
(EC IP/08/1849, 1; Guardia Civil 2008).3 
In ‘un-boxing’ SIVE I aim to critique the supposedly ever-vigilant surveillance 
and life-saving capabilities of the SIVE surveillance system by foregrounding 
the interactions between the various human and machine elements of SIVE. 
While claims that maritime surveillance technologies save lives have been 
criticised previously (e.g. Heller and Jones 2014; Rijpma and Vermeulen 
2015; Pallister-Wilkins 2015; Bellanova and Duez 2016), few have taken the 
everyday performances of border guards and the materialities of the 
borderspace as a methodological starting point for their research. Moreover, 
the formal position of the EU remains that maritime surveillance technologies 
do save lives in the Mediterranean, that they are no longer used for ‘push 
back’ operations and, increasingly, that they are integral to solving ‘Europe’s 
migration crisis’ (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 
2013), despite the arguments of the civil society to the contrary (Alarm 
Phone 2017). An increasing number of studies, however, are beginning to 
focus on the everyday performances of the EU’s EUROSUR ‘near real time’ 
surveillance system, however, though its capabilities are still developing. Both 
Tazzioli (2016) and Dijstelbloem et al (2017) highlight how, for a system 
which supposedly functions in ‘near real time’, EUROSUR is still a slow 
system – its vision capabilities on interactive maps being predominantly used 
to create visualisations of historic incidents in order to more accurately 
predict future ones. Due to the speed with which it has been designed to 
operate, however, SIVE is in this respect very different from EUROSUR. 
Nonetheless, the war for speed remains an issue for the Guardia Civil and 
will be discussed in this article. 
In the following section I set out the ways in which assemblage theory 
can contribute to the newly-established ‘practice turn’ in border studies. I 
argue that assemblage theory offers the opportunity of situating those who 
‘do surveillance’ within large socio-technical systems, while also recognising 
the agency of matter and the need to focus on interactions rather than 
properties. Thereafter I focus on how vision is produced amid the everyday 
realities of the borderspace. I detail how, as well as negotiating the use 
of the SIVE technologies, Spanish border guards must contend with the 
actions of migrants, smugglers and the geophysical environment. In the third 
empirical section, I discuss the ways in which the geopolitical gaze produced 
by SIVE is susceptible both to the rebellion of its actors, as well as the 
volatile environment of the borderspace itself. 
Finally, a note on method. Gaining access to both the borderspace and to 
those employed to control it can be challenging for researchers (Côté-
Boucher et al 2014), and my experiences of this have been no different. 
My initial requests to conduct a lengthy participant observation of the SIVE 
control centres was, unsurprisingly, rebuffed. Nevertheless, I was eventually 
granted access to the SIVE control stations of Ceuta and Algeciras on 
three separate occasions, as well as once to the mobile búho at the 
border fence. Aside from my first visit to the SIVE control station in October 
2013, these visits took place in the summer of 2014. On these occasions 
I was largely left free to observe the border guards and to conduct 
unstructured interviews with them as they worked. Semi-structured interviews 
were also conducted with the on-site technician in Algeciras, as well as a 
Guardia Civil officer in Ceuta. The paper also draws from secondary material 
published by the Guardia Civil to promote the successes of SIVE. Though 
my time spent at the SIVE stations was short, I have nonetheless been 
able to gain an insight into the situated experiences of the Guardia Civil 
border guards as perform Spain’s maritime border through SIVE. 
   
Figure 1 shows the SIVE radar tower protecting the landscape from what might lurk in the bank of 
encroaching fog. Original caption reads: “A bank of fog covering the coast of Estepona (Málaga) straight 
in front of a sensor station” (Guardia Civil, 2009, 111). Published with the permission of the Guardia Civil. 
 
THE BORDER AS ASSEMBLAGE 
The diffusion of the border beyond and between national lines has 
necessitated a reconceptualising of borders to take account of the fluidity 
of what had previously predominantly been thought of as static entities tied 
down to the extremities of territory. Parker and Vaughan-Williams (2012, 
729), especially, have called for critical border studies to “shift from the 
concept of the border to the notion of bordering practice; and the adoption 
of the lens of performance through which bordering practices are produced 
and reproduced.” Similarly the term ‘borderscapes’ has been adopted in 
order to capture the complexity of the interactions through which border 
landscapes are continuously being (re)produced (Rajaram and Grundy-Warr 
2007). The landscapes concept, moreover, re-centres attention on the 
mundane and emphasises the need to ‘humanise’ borders (Brambilla 2015). 
This conceptual shift in border studies from understanding borders as fixed 
lines to a combination of social, cultural and political processes has, 
therefore, presented scholars with a myriad of new questions. Alongside the 
obvious question of ‘where is the border?’ arises, amongst others, the 
apparently simple question ‘who borders?’ (Johnson et al 2011). As Rumford 
(2006) and Côté-Boucher et al (2014) argue, ‘borderwork’ has been delegated 
to an ever-growing list of local, transnational and private actors outside the 
state apparatus; these include airline staff, private security firms, software 
developers, risk consultants, engineers, designers and systems experts (Bigo 
2002; Walters 2006; Vukov and Sheller 2013). Following Parker and Vaughan-
Williams’ (2009, 2012) push towards studying borders as practice, therefore, 
we must then also ask ‘how do they border?’ and find the methods for 
answering such questions. 
Despite these repeated calls to ‘humanise borders’ and to focus on the 
politics of the everyday, however, such has been the concern with the 
global extent of the border assemblage and the consequences of its 
incessant creep on a macro scale, that a recent edition in Security Dialogue 
highlighted the need to re-engage with the ‘practice turn’ through empirical 
material focusing on the experiences of border agents in the field (Côté-
Boucher et al 2014). Bigo (2014, 211), in particular, details how attempts 
to understand the (in)securitisation of European border control frequently 
suffer from a lack of “attention to the dispositions of the agents and the 
contexts” which form a crucial part of the geographies of border control. 
Similarly, while scholars have focused on the digitisation of the border 
through biometric technologies (see for example Amoore 2006, 2009; Ajana 
2013), Amicelle et al (2015) argue that greater attention needs to be paid 
to the socio-technical (and material) qualities of other security devices and 
the ways in which the border is performed on a daily basis by their use. 
Furthermore, Amicelle et al (2015) urge border scholars to acknowledge the 
(social) contexts in which security devices are deployed and how this 
shapes or constrains the deployment of these devices. Here I propose 
assemblage theory as a possible means through which the embodied 
experiences of doing security can be held in productive tension with non-
human agency and an attentiveness to context. 
Assemblage theory, following Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) work on 
agencement, offers a non-dualistic approach in which society can be viewed 
as rhizomatic, nodal networks that come together and fall apart, rather than 
as a series of static wholes (DeLanda 2006). There has been a propensity 
in border studies, however, to utilise assemblage theory predominantly as a 
means of conceptualising the pervasiveness of the modern border and the 
ways in which it makes connections across topological space. Graham 
(2011, 132), for example, writes that there will be a point at which borders 
will no longer be geophysical lines and filters and states, becoming instead 
“increasingly interoperable assemblages of control technologies strung out 
across the world's infrastructures, circulations, cities, and bodies”. Other 
examples of similarly ‘big things’ (Jacobs 2006) related to the border that 
are viewed through the lens of assemblage theory in border studies include 
the global ‘circulation assemblage’ (Salter 2013), Andersson’s (2016) ‘illegality 
industry’ as assemblage, Europe’s ‘border-work’ of fluid mechanisms and 
actors (Bialasiewicz 2012) and Haggerty and Ericson’s (2000) ‘surveillant 
assemblage’. In each of these cases assemblage adds something valuable 
to the analysis beyond simply demonstrating the scale and interconnectedness 
of the network. For Salter (2013) and Bialasiewicz (2012), for example, 
thinking of the global mobility regime and EUrope’s border regime as 
assemblages allows for accounts of the disaggregation of the respective 
systems – neither assemblage can be considered governed by a single 
overriding logic or dominated by one particular group.  
There is, however, also the possibility of going smaller – both in terms of 
the size of the assemblage and the scale at which it is analysed. An 
assemblage is, after all, any ad-hoc grouping of any diverse elements that 
have a co-functioning together (Bennett 2010). In an analysis of a steel 
plant in the UK, for example, Swanton (2013) demonstrates how otherwise 
marginalised practices of health and safety, retrofitting and maintenance are 
vital to understanding how steel is produced – or how production can 
spectacularly fail. Meanwhile Williams (2011) considers military Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicles as assemblages for the purpose of questioning the systems’ 
ability to provide ‘more-than-human’ vision while human elements remain in 
the network. Williams’ (2011) work, therefore, demonstrates how assemblage 
theory can be used to focus on the performances of one set of actors (in 
this case the human UAV pilots) and their relations to the other actors 
within the assemblage (i.e. cameras, screens and joysticks). This focus on 
the interactions of technologies, materials and humans points to a central 
tenet of assemblage theory, which is that it “reorients our approach to 
phenomena by insisting on the autonomy of component parts” (Anderson et 
al 2012, 177). Agency, therefore, is located in both the human and non-
human actors with in the assemblage (Bennett 2010). A consequence of 
this autonomy for Swanton (2013) is that the production of steel is no 
longer guaranteed from the steel plant; instead it is an achievement of 
socio-material processes which can also fall apart. In context of SIVE, 
therefore, the production of (in)security is not treated as a given simply 
because of the assembled presence of various security actors. Moreover 
the focus of my analysis in the following sections will be predominantly on 
the interactions between the component parts of SIVE, rather than their 
individual properties. 
Another consequence of the ontological shift brought about by a focus on 
the relations between actors is an attendance to the importance of multiplicity 
(Sohn 2015). In particular, assemblage foregrounds the constant, diffuse and 
tangled effort that goes into the assembling and re-assembling of socio-
technical systems and socio-material practices. Assemblage, therefore, 
“emphasises spatiality and temporality: elements are drawn together at a 
particular conjuncture only to disperse or realign, and the shape shifts” 
(Anderson and McFarlane 2011, p124-5). In other words, if the component 
parts of an assemblage subsist independently from each other and can be 
regularly subtracted or added to the whole, then there is no ‘core essence’ 
to an assemblage and nor are the various elements akin to pieces of a 
jigsaw puzzle (Nail 2017). What this requires from border studies and 
security analyses, therefore, is a conceptual shift that takes account of the 
dynamism of the actors which comprise surveillance systems such as SIVE. 
As a result, the contours of SIVE itself are considered blurred rather than 
static as new actors become drawn in and are lashed together.  
Yet while these new additions might be moved, changed and made to act, 
power is neither exerted upon the assemblage ‘from above’ nor by one 
particular actor upon the rest. Instead, power “must be understood as 
distributed among the various components of that assemblage, human and 
non-human” (Dittmer 2014, 389). Entities, moreover, are never fully actualised 
within the relations of the assemblage (Anderson et al 2012), their properties 
only partially encountered and incorporated (Shaw 2012). As a result, there 
is no guarantee that actors will remain ‘loyal’ to their counterparts within 
the assemblage, or that they will react predictably to contextual changes or 
the addition of new actors (Bennett 2010). Even objects, write Meehan et 
al (2013), can counteract the assumed aims of the assemblage within which 
they are located through acts of refusal and technological rebellion. By 
viewing power distributed amongst numerous actors, therefore, assemblage 
theory follows on from feminist geopolitics by eschewing state-centric analyses 
of geopolitics in which only the ‘elites’ have voices that matter (Dittmer 
2014; see Secor 2001; Hyndman 2004).  
Finally, assemblage theory also attends to Amicelle et al’s (2015) call for a 
focus on the ‘contexts’ in which security devices are deployed – though context 
in this case is extended to mean the physical environment, as well as the 
social. Indeed Elden (in Steinberg and Peters 2015) notes how the ‘geo’ in 
geopolitics usually refers to ‘space’ or ‘the global’, as opposed to ‘the Earth’ 
upon which we stand. As a result, the material qualities of territory are often 
written out of geopolitical narratives and analyses of border security (Boyce 
2016). Allied with recent work on material politics (e.g. Barry 2014; Slesinger 
2018) and post-humanist political ecologies (e.g. Sundberg 2011; Boyce 2016), 
therefore, a central analytical starting point to this paper is that neither the 
material nor the (bio)physical elements that form part of the borderspace should 
be considered stable foundations upon which (geo)politics takes place. Rather, 
the series of unpredictable dynamic forcings that constitute the geophysical are 
integral to the unfolding of political controversies that concern the border (see 
Dittmer 2014; Steinberg and Peters 2015). In the context of SIVE, especially, 
performing the border amidst the ever-changeable environment produces a number 
of challenges both for the human and non-human elements of the system. 
Indeed the ‘things’ that appear in the guards’ scopes are fleeting, ambiguous 
and more-than-single (see Walters 2014); their partialities further complicating the 
interactions between the elements within the SIVE assemblage. The borderspace 
itself, therefore, can be seen to resist capture by the SIVE vision technologies. 
FACT OR FRICTION? 
The local geography of Morocco and southern Spain offers significant 
challenges to migrants attempting to make the covert crossing either to 
Ceuta or across the Strait to mainland Spain. Strong currents and waves 
mean that boats can drift at sea for days as migrants often attempt to 
paddle to Ceuta or use old engines which are prone to cutting out. The 
occasionally rough conditions can also easily sink an overcrowded wooden 
fishing boat or soft-hulled zodiac vessel, while the (sometimes total) cloud-
cover can obscure the coastal lights used by the migrants as reference 
points for Europe. On the land, too, the environment in Ceuta appears to 
favour the Guardia Civil. The border fences are surrounded by rocky terrain 
on the Moroccan side, which is used only by farmers allowing their flocks 
to graze. Moreover, the Spanish side of the fence has been designated as 
a ‘no-go zone’, giving the Guardia Civil the sole use of the tarmac road 
which runs alongside the fence – thus significantly reducing the ‘friction of 
distance’ (Scott 2009) offered by the rough landscape.  
For the border guard charged with monitoring the border at night from the 
mobile infrared camera station, however, the rugged biophysical materialities 
of the borderspace also pose a significant challenge to their watchfulness 
(see Boyce 2016). On the screen a human will appear as a black, pixelated 
shape that is still vaguely-humanoid. Surprisingly, Miguel reckoned he could 
still distinguish the difference between a human and another animal at a 
distance of about ten kilometres. Under poor climatic conditions, however, 
the non-human elements of the terrain can escape political capture and 
impede the guards’ attempts at controlling the borderspace by increasing 
the ‘friction’ of the terrain. In humid conditions, for example, the pixelated 
shapes become even less distinct – meaning that the point at which Miguel 
can distinguish a crouching human from a resting goat can be reduced to 
just four kilometres. Similarly, if the temperature during the day has been 
particularly hot, the rocks can emanate enough heat to confuse the on-
board laser (used to determine the distance between the vehicle and a 
suspicious object). Worse, the rocks can occasionally retain so much heat 
that Miguel claims it can be hard to distinguish between a rock and a 
man’s head (which is often the only part of the body he can see when 
a person is crouching down). This ‘friction’ offered by the environment, 
however, is not limited to the Moroccan shepherds, their animals and the 
humanoid rocks. Occasionally those trying to escape Miguel’s gaze will use 
large squares of cardboard to hide their body heat from the camera. While 
this tactic works when they remain stationary, says Miguel, “when they 
move it looks like the whole mountain is moving!” 
For the border guards operating SIVE’s radar technology and cameras, they 
are aided by the fact that the system was specifically designed to cope 
with the environmental challenges posed by the marine environment ‘under 
any circumstances’ (Guardia Civil 2008, 59). Indeed the SIVE station in 
Algeciras, which controls the marine border between Barbate and Soto 
Grande, uses five separate radar stations. Together, explained Antonio (the 
on-site technician), their radar signals overlap and give the border guards 
reliable information on the speeds and directions of the myriad of vessels 
located in their search area. The radar is therefore an integral part of the 
SIVE system, offering what could be described as a God’s Eye view of 
the marine area (see Haraway 1991; O’Tuathail 1996), making it theoretically 
possible for the border guards to spot a suspicious vessel at a distance 
of roughly 14km from the coast (Indra 2016). 
Despite the Guardia Civil’s claims in their promotional material that the 
environment has been overcome through SIVE (and Antonio’s similar 
assertions), however, the experiences of the border guards on duty tell a 
different story. Following Antonio’s departure from the SIVE control room in 
Algeciras, the border guards on duty were quick to inform me of the 
difficulties they have when using the radar to search for and target migrant 
boats. Indeed, far from being able to remove and isolate the objects within 
their scopes (Weber 2005), the active terrain provides the guards with 
constant distractions. “The radar often gives us false readings,” explained 
Eduardo, the senior border guard in the SIVE control room of Algeciras, 
“but it can really be from anything. Waves, whales, dolphins, fishing 
materials, they can all appear as something suspicious on the radar. One 
day I was monitoring this area here [points towards the area Algeciras’ 
surveillance area closest to Morocco], and I saw some crazy readings 
coming from the radar. So I centred my camera to where I thought the 
readings were coming from and do you know what I saw? It was birds 
on their seasonal migration journey!” By performing the borderspace as a 
two-dimensional reality (Elden 2013), therefore, the radar screens were aimed 
at giving the guards a ‘more-than-human vision’ (Williams 2011) as the 
borderspace became flatter and more legible. Simultaneously, however, the 
radar removed the fixed, solid and benign appearances of the objects in 
its field of vision, giving them instead a threatening appearance through 
their indeterminacy (Budd and Adey 2009). In this way, the radar transforms 
the everyday natural occurrences of this marine environment, which might 
otherwise be considered beautiful to the naked eye, into ‘suspicious’ events 
that draw the guards’ attention.  
Operating the radar in Ceuta, despite the much smaller surveillance area, 
provided the guards with similar issues. Here, however, they were faced 
with a much greater problem, namely the radar’s blind spots. Surprisingly 
for a system that had ostensibly been designed specifically for spotting 
small vessels at sea in difficult conditions, significant areas of the screen 
were effectively ‘muted’. It transpired that the radar’s blind spots included 
most of the area within one nautical mile off the coast due to the local 
vegetation, rocks and waves which could regularly trick the system. As a 
result, a slow boat travelling along the coast (a typical route used by 
migrants attempting the journey in the small, engine-less ‘toy’ boats) will be 
invisible to the ‘God’s Eye’ of the radar. These spaces could, of course, 
be ‘un-muted’ (the sensitivity of the radar is set to pick up objects moving 
at a speed of two knots). This would, however, inundate the guards on 
duty with false alarms to the extent that the radar images would become 
illegible. By rendering the borderspace visible through techniques of flattening 
and by making what that which is geographically distant ‘interactionally 
present’ (Knorr and Bruegger 2002), therefore, the interactive screens used 
by the guards are not just sites upon which the borderspace is reproduced. 
In other words, the screens do not perform a border that exists independently 
of them (Hardie and MacKenzie 2006, 59), therefore, as instead they are 
one of its “conditions of possibility” that produce specific effects of cognition 
and action (Swanton 2013). It requires an experienced guard with significant 
know-how, therefore, to work with SIVE’s agentic technologies.  
 
Figure 2 shows a stationary Guardia Civil officer manipulating SIVE's control systems while observing the 
screens for suspicious activity. Original caption reads: “One of the stations is controlled manually by a 
member of the Fiscal Service Patrol” (Guardia Civil, 2009, 106). Published with the permission of the 
Guardia Civil. 
BEHIND THE SCOPES 
As has already been made clear, in an effort to enable a ‘more-than-
human’ vision (Williams 2011), the machine elements within the SIVE 
assemblage offer the border guards various multi-layered images (in ‘real-
time’) such that the borderspace can be permanently made visible to the 
Guardia Civil (see Graham 2016). Yet as Williams (2011) has demonstrated 
concerning drone assemblages, “[w]hilst the requirement for there to be a 
human operator within the UAV assemblage remains, this desire for more-
than-human vision is unmet” (Williams 2011, 386). While the vision produced 
through these assemblages might be technologically enhanced, therefore, 
“these visibilities are necessarily conditional […] because they are not technical 
but rather techno-cultural accomplishments” (Gregory, 2011, 193 emphasis in 
original; see also Adey, 2010; Kaplan, 2006; Follis 2017). In other words, 
technologies can only ‘see’ what they have been designed to see – and 
they are based on the assumptions that have been made by their creators. 
In the context of SIVE and drones, moreover, responsibility still lies with 
the human eyes of border guards and soldiers to offer the final interpretation 
of the objects shown through the complex vision technologies. In discussing 
the limitations of the drone assemblage, Williams (2011) utilises Virillio’s 
(1991) ‘picnoleptic moment’ to argue that the continual watching of the 
drone assemblage is partly outdone by the humans’ inability to watch 
without blinking. While the drones’ cameras might be able to offer a 
constant picture in ‘real-time’, therefore, the organic elements of the 
assemblage resist the possibility of achieving an unblinking vision (Williams 
2011).  
In the context of SIVE, however, both the human and machine elements 
suffer from their own forms of picnolepsy. Aside from detecting and projecting 
all ‘unknown’ objects as foreign and threatening, the radar only ‘sees’ 
objects that travel at a speed higher than two knots for a period of at 
least eight seconds. The radar’s ‘blinks’, therefore, are regular and 
unavoidable. In terms of spotting most drug-smuggling activity this poses 
few problems as these are usually transported by speedboat (at a speed 
of 40 knots). Boats transporting migrants (either with old engines or none 
at all), by contrast, regularly travel at a speed between one and three 
knots and are, therefore, barely perceptible to SIVE’s radar. Instead, a boat 
carrying migrants will most likely occur as an occasional blip on the radar 
screen (if it appears at all), rather than as a constantly detectable presence. 
The ‘blip’ would then have to be spotted immediately by the border guard 
on duty so that it could be investigated further by using the camera. Not 
only is the radar susceptible to its own version of picnolepsy, therefore, 
but the system demands the speedy cooperation between radar – (alert) 
guard – and camera if it is to function effectively. Aside from regularly 
filtering out false alarms, then, the border guards must also maintain an 
unbroken vision of the radar screen if they are to spot a ‘blip’ from a 
migrant boat. 
Achieving this unbroken vision for the border guards, however, is far from 
guaranteed. To a certain extent the technologies have even hindered the 
guards’ attempts at remaining vigilant. As with many forms of automation, 
the assumption has been made that technological solutions can replace the 
human actors of the system. Although the overall numbers of Guardia Civil 
border guards being sent to the border has increased in recent years, the 
number of guards in the SIVE control rooms in Ceuta and Algeciras has 
remained low. While in Ceuta I only ever observed one guard operating 
the SIVE cameras, three were on duty in Algeciras – although Eduardo 
and I were frequently the only ones in the room. The lived reality for the 
border guards in Algeciras, moreover, is that multi-task management means 
that their ability to ensure constant vigilance is limited. The command centre 
in Algeciras is also what the Guardia Civil refer to as a ‘centro de mando 
y control’, meaning that it acts as a central node in the Guardia Civil’s 
information network. Information from the surrounding area (concerning such 
things as fires and robberies) gets sent to the guard’s computer terminal. 
There, the guard on duty manually filters it and the important information 
is sent on to the national coordination centre in Madrid. This information 
that needs to be filtered and passed on, in combination with other daily 
tasks (such as personal administrative work) and the random additional 
disturbances that occur throughout the day (telephone calls, everyday errands, 
nosy PhD students and other visitors), frequently create disturbances for the 
guards on duty. As a result, it is possible that at times there is no ‘ever-
vigilant’ guard to watch the screens. 
When the guards are able to dedicate their attention to the monitoring of 
the screens, they rely on SIVE’s immensely powerful cameras to overcome 
the radar’s aforementioned flaws. Indra, the company who designed SIVE, 
boast that during the day the system’s cameras can detect a small boat 
at a distance of 20km, while at night this estimate is reduced to a (still-
astonishing) 13km. Despite the quality of the images produced by the SIVE 
cameras, however, the information on the screens still requires a significant 
amount of experienced guesswork and ‘know how’ to interpret. For the 
‘trick’, as it were, with vision technologies is not so much acquiring the 
power of sight, as it is acquiring the ability to view ‘change’ or deviance 
from the ‘norm’ (Graham and Wood 2003; Adey 2004; Scranton 2007; 
Amoore 2009; Graham 2010).While scanning the Moroccan hillside from the 
safety of the búho with his infrared camera, Miguel explains that migrants 
will sometimes purchase small fishing boats and mimic the movements of 
fisherman casting their nets at night. “I’ve never been fishing and I don’t 
know how to fish,” he said jovially, “but I know exactly what it looks like 
from a distance. I know the process, roughly how long it lasts and where 
it happens… just through operating this joystick!” In order to demonstrate 
his point, Miguel pointed the camera out into the dark bay at the small 
fishing boats in Moroccan waters. Miguel had monitored their movements 
when they first had first left the harbour in Fnideq, swapping regularly 
between observing the boats and the land area around the fence. “That 
one is a little suspicious though,” he said zooming in on the boat furthest 
out in the bay, “it has no lights on and hasn’t followed the circular route 
the fishermen usually take when they cast their nets.” To my eyes, however, 
the pixels on the screen were barely recognisable as a boat, let alone a 
small fishing vessel with one or more people on board. Eventually Miguel 
turned the camera away from the boat, claiming that he would keep an 
eye on its position while conducting another scan of the area near the 
fence. 
An associated difficulty with waiting for something out of the ordinary to 
happen in a situation such as the one described above is, of course, that 
while Miguel waited to see what the suspicious vessel might do, his eyes 
had been forced away from monitoring the land border. In the SIVE 
assemblage, only the radar can observe everywhere at once. While the 
cameras have a wide range when zoomed out and can be rotated at will, 
in order to spot and identify a migrant boat or group heading to the fence, 
the cameras often have to be utilised at full zoom. The result is that the 
guards’ peripheral vision is almost entirely lost and, without the possibility 
of making use of their other senses, the areas outside the camera’s zoomed 
vision become large blind spots. This frequently poses few problems as a 
broad sweep of a guard’s area of responsibility takes little time and the 
guards frequently zoom out during checks. Occasionally, however, this rhythm 
of focused watching followed by broad sweeps is broken up by particular 
events requiring the guards’ undivided attention. This is especially the case 
following the detection of a potential drug-smuggling attempt across the 
Strait. According to Eduardo, these moments can be the most stressful for 
the border guard on duty as they must coordinate an interception with the 
Guardia Civil’s marine unit, as well as arrange for land-based units to 
intercept and search for other smugglers. On other occasions a boat carrying 
drugs will briefly become visible on the radar as it speeds towards Spanish 
waters, but will then disappear again as it waits for an opportune moment 
to make a drop. Throughout this time the guard on duty must use his 
camera to comb through the area in the hopes of spotting the boat before 
it makes its move. 
For the border guards in the SIVE assemblage the decision to raise the 
alarm rests entirely with them and their knowledge of the borderspace. Yet 
those on duty both in Ceuta and Algeciras agreed that it can take a 
guard at least ten years to become proficient with the technology, to know 
the borderspace and to make speedy decisions based on what they can 
and cannot see. Not all border guards, moreover, have the same skill-sets 
as their colleagues. While some guards claim to be able to tell a sub-
Saharan migrant from a Moroccan farmer through the infrared camera solely 
by the type of their clothing, others are considered to be better at spotting 
small movements a long way off and yet others are more proficient at 
overcoming the difficulties presented by the fog or cloud cover. In other 
words, the SIVE assemblage does not offer one singular controlling gaze 
over the borderspace. Instead, the geopolitical gaze of the Guardia Civil’s 
surveillance technologies is performed through a multitude of unique gazes 
(Law 2002; Williams 2011). Beyond managing these numerous gazes, 
however, the ‘success’ of the system is also predicated on the achievement 
of swift interceptions by the Guardia Civil’s allies in the borderspace. A 
challenge I turn to in the following section.   
ALLIANCES AND BREAKAGES 
“The border is like a chewing gum,” proclaimed Lucas in Ceuta’s SIVE 
station, referring to the constant, unpredictable pressures exerted on the 
border. While Lucas’ chewing gum analogy, of course, meant that everything 
could change from one day to the next, ‘tomorrow’ also happened to be 
Ramadan. None of the Guardia Civil officers in the SIVE control room 
knew how Ramadan was going to affect their work, even though it was a 
religious festival none of them would be observing. They suspected it might 
in fact ease the pressure on the border, as most of the migrants making 
the border crossing attempts are Muslim. Similarly there might also be 
fewer small fishing vessels out in the bay, as people would be eating with 
their families at night and saving their energy during the day – meaning 
fewer boats to monitor. The opposite, however, could also be true. The 
Guardia Civil officers were concerned that their Moroccan counterparts might 
tire during their month of fasting and become less watchful. Indeed, the 
Guardia Civil officers were candid on their reliance on the ‘clean up’ 
operations (literal translation) conducted by their Moroccan counterparts in 
the nearby forest. “Otherwise we’d be completely overrun with them,” 
grumbled Lucas. In other words, SIVE and the border fence are the border 
assemblage’s last line of defence, rather than the first. The complex array 
of these vision technologies are, therefore, only employed in Ceuta on the 
people who have already made it passed the tight control of the Moroccan 
border guards.  
The Moroccan patrol boats, however, are also crucial to the functioning of 
the SIVE system, should a migrant boat manage to evade the attentions 
of the Moroccan guards on the land before setting off. If a guard in the 
Ceuta control room spots a migrant boat through either SIVE’s camera or 
the radar, he immediately notifies the Guardia Civil’s patrol boat, the 
Salvamento Marítimo and the Moroccan forces (with whom they have a 
direct link). The Guardia Civil’s patrol boat will accompany the Salvamento 
Marítimo rescue boat if the migrant vessel is located in Spanish waters, 
intervening only in an emergency and if the vessel in distress is in Spanish 
waters.4 In Moroccan waters, by contrast, the Moroccan patrol boat or 
rescue service would be expected to ‘rescue’ the migrant vessel (regardless 
of its level of distress) and bring the migrants back to Morocco – whereupon 
they can often experience severe beatings and occasionally face transportation 
hundreds of miles from the border. As a result, the SIVE vision technologies 
are often used by the Guardia Civil in Ceuta to circumvent the international 
non-refoulement agreement. Occasionally, however, the system breaks down 
and the actors in Morocco fail to act. This can occur if the Moroccan 
patrol boats are already engaged in other activities and if the Salvamento 
Marítimo fail to establish contact with the Moroccan rescue services. In 
such cases the Salvamento Marítimo is required to enter Moroccan waters 
to rescue the migrant vessel and return it to a Spanish port. In other 
words, speed, alongside the ability to see in ‘real time’, is essential to the 
proper functioning of the border assemblage.  
Drawing on Virilio’s (1994) visions of the increasing speed of modern 
warfare, the border between Ceuta and Morocco can therefore be found 
less in a particular line to be defended and rather in the time required 
for the Guardia Civil to spot a migrant boat and coordinate an interception 
with the Moroccan authorities. The extent to which the system functions in 
‘real time’ is regularly tested to its limits as guards operating the SIVE 
technologies must spot and notify the Moroccan patrol of a migrant vessel 
long before it can reach Spanish waters. The quick responses of the 
Spanish and Moroccan border guards can be contrasted against previous, 
high-profile, boat migration events that managed to captivate peoples’ 
attentions during the time it took for governments to organise a response. 
Examples of these include the Tampa and the SIEVX in Australian waters 
in 2001 (Budz 2009) and the ‘left-to-die-boat’, which was ignored in the 
Mediterranean by NATO forces (Pezzani and Heller 2013). The speed on 
which the system in Ceuta is based means that, unlike these high-profile 
cases, there is increasingly less time for politics to occur between a boat 
being spotted and a state’s response (Virilio 1994; 2005; Bartram 2004). 
Prior to my visit to the SIVE station in Algeciras I had assumed the 
guards there would follow a similar protocol to that of their colleagues in 
Ceuta. Indeed, Antonio, the Amper technician, appeared to confirm as much 
when I asked him why the guards on duty did not appear to be fully 
engaged in searching for migrant boats. “It’s the wrong time of day,” he 
explained, “if you had come around 6am you would have seen the guards 
watching the screens, carefully searching for the pateras.” This assertion 
was later, however, contradicted by Eduardo and his colleague, José, who 
claimed that pateras could reach their surveillance areas at any time of 
day. “We do try and search for pateras in Moroccan waters with the 
cameras sometimes,” explained José, “but it’s incredibly difficult […] When 
using the infrared camera you’re searching for this tiny heat source, and 
sometimes you confuse it with a dead pixel on the display.” While ostensibly, 
therefore, the guards in Algeciras could use the cameras and radar 
technology to notify the Moroccan guards of inbound migrant vessels, in 
practice these aren’t spotted by the guards in the station until they have 
reached international waters between Spain and Morocco – at which point 
neither the Moroccan patrol boats nor their rescue service are likely to 
react. Aside from tackling drug smugglers whose boats are detectable via 
the radar, therefore, the SIVE station in Algeciras can for now ‘only’ be 
used for the detection and rescue of migrant boats beyond Moroccan 
waters. Despite the Guardia Civil’s aim of ‘pinching space’ (see Serres and 
Latour 1995) in order to enact the border well beyond Spanish territorial 
waters through SIVE, therefore, only the SIVE station in Ceuta was capable 
of doing so.   
Occasionally, however, the system breaks down as a result of the external 
actors f the Guardia Civil’s direct control. In the first four months of 2014, 
for example, the number of successful border crossing attempts between 
Morocco and Spain shot up to 2,800,5 130% more than for the same 
period the year before (Frontex 2014). The Frontex Risk Analysis (2014) 
avoided mentioning the cause of the increased border crossings, mentioning 
only that the Spanish Guardia Civil had warned of increasing numbers of 
migrants in the makeshift camps near the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. 
Eduardo, however, was much more scathing in his assessment of what had 
happened it January 2014. “It all depends on the Moroccan King,” he said, 
“if he’s happy, the Moroccan guards will do their jobs. But if Morocco 
wants something from the EU, such as more money [from the EU European 
Neighborhood Policy], then he’ll use the migrants to bargain with. We had 
1,200 migrants arrive in just 72 hours last year… That was not increased 
migrant pressure, it was the Moroccan guards telling them to go!” 
Despite the expenses invested in SIVE, therefore, the European border 
assemblage is almost entirely dependent on the cooperation of the Moroccan 
army and its work in the hills of Northern Morocco. Though SIVE can only 
‘see’ beyond the borders of the EU, the actors of the border assemblage 
spread beyond it. In fact, the assemblage extends to within the boats used 
by the migrants. Unlike the wooden or inflatable toy boats bought by the 
smugglers and used by the migrants, the old motors used to propel these 
vessels can sometimes be used by the Guardia Civil to track the smuggler 
gangs in Morocco. In order to reduce the danger to themselves, therefore, 
migrants are warned by the smugglers that the Guardia Civil will prosecute 
the captain (or the whole crew) of a boat with a motor and that the 
Spanish will be able to see them through the cameras. It has, therefore, 
become common practice for migrants to throw their engines overboard after 
leaving Moroccan waters and to wait until they are spotted by the SIVE 
system. While it is unknown if this has contributed to any migrant deaths 
in Ceuta, in 2013 a patera off the coast of Lanzarote was rammed at 
high speed by a Guardia Civil patrol boat after the ‘captain’ of the patera 
had abandoned the engine and rudder for fear of being prosecuted as a 
smuggler (Ferrer-Gallardo and van Houtum 2014).6 There are two points to 
be made here. Firstly, broadening of the border assemblage to include the 
objects that migrants need to reach Europe has in this respect further 
endangered the lives of those attempting to make the crossing. Secondly, 
the changing tactic of the migrants and smugglers demonstrates the roles 
that their agency plays in the formation of the borderspace and how this, 
in turn, will affect the ways in which the Guardia Civil can perform the 
border. There is no way of knowing, for example, if migrants might soon 
be convinced to employ the same tactics in attempts at reaching mainland 
Spain, where they could find themselves trapped in the major shipping 
lanes or pushed off course due to the strong currents. In broadening the 
border assemblage to include the objects that migrants need to reach 
Europe, therefore, the lives of those attempting to make the crossing have 
become further endangered.  
A second interesting development concerning the case in Lanzarote, however, 
was the fact that the recordings from the SIVE cameras were obtained by 
a local news station and used to invalidate the Guardia Civil’s initial account 
of what had happened (Ferrer-Gallardo and van Houtum 2014). Similarly, in 
an infamous case of 15 deaths occurring in the sea area alongside the 
border crossing point of El Tarajal, Guardia Civil recordings were obtained 
by NGOs and the Spanish media. It was hoped that the Guardia Civil 
security recordings, either from SIVE cameras, or from the security cameras 
on the border would provide evidence firstly of where the deaths had 
occurred (the Guardia Civil claimed they had died in Moroccan waters) and 
secondly, whether or not the Guardia Civil had fired rubber bullets and 
smoke canisters at the drowning men.7 While in both cases the Guardia 
Civil were eventually exonerated by the Spanish courts (the case in Ceuta 
supposedly because of the poor image quality of the security recordings),8 
these two exceptional events do demonstrate the lack of total control exerted 
by the Guardia Civil over the actors in the border assemblage. The cameras 
of the Guardia Civil, it would seem, watch both ways. 
If the circumstances surrounding the Guardia Civil’s loss of control over the 
actors in the assemblage were exceptional, however, the border guards face a 
similar struggle on a daily basis. Just as the Guardia Civil are not always the 
sole users of the security recordings, so too can the Salvamento Marítimo be 
called by the migrants at sea or NGO groups who learn of their departure. 
Examples of NGO groups that are having a strong effect on the border 
assemblage include ‘the Alarm phone’ and ‘WatchtheMed.net’. The first offers a 
hotline that migrants can phone at sea in an emergency, the volunteers then 
contact the nearest rescue services and track the boat’s recovery. Linked to 
this, ‘WatchtheMed.net’ is an online mapping platform that catalogues and 
monitors boat distress calls and positions them within the correct search and 
rescue zones and operational areas. The group uses the accounts of survivors 
and witnesses, but also the analysis of ocean currents, winds, mobile phone 
data, satellite imagery and vessel AIS in order to spatialise events at sea. 
Through this spatialisation, the complex legal and political geography of the sea 
is made visible such that ongoing events at sea can be monitored in near 
‘real time’ in an attempt to bring governments and rescue agencies to account 
should they fail to enact a SAR mission in their area or in cases where 
coastguards have been accused of pushing migrant boats back into non-European 
waters (see Dijstelbloem et al 2017). The use and manipulation (through ‘mission 
creep’) of vessel AIS and satellite data is, therefore, not a tactic solely limited 
to border agencies. Pezzani and Heller (2013, 294) call this challenge to the 
God’s Eye view of European surveillance a ‘Disobedient Gaze’, “which aims not 
to disclose what the regime of migration management attempts to unveil - 
clandestine migration; but unveil that which it attempts to hide - the political 
violence it is founded on and the human rights violations that are its structural 
outcome.” The effect of this Disobedient Gaze is hard to quantify, although to 
date, WatchtheMed has published the details of over 700 cases in which they 
were informed of one more vessels in distress – almost all of which were 
saved by the relevant authority. The real success of the initiative, writes Tazzioli 
(2016, 576), comes in its ‘twisting’ of the politics of visibility; the capacity to 
detect has now become the “inescapable duty of rescue.” While Virillio’s (1994, 
205) phrase “the tyranny of real time” is becoming increasingly apt for those 
attempting to remain undiscovered from Europe’s surveillance gaze, therefore, it 
is increasingly also being made applicable to those behind the scopes. Indeed, 
in Ceuta the effect of the group’s actions was perhaps best be summed up 
by Lucas during our first discussion in the enclave’s Guardia Civil’s headquarters, 
when I asked if he could describe SIVE: “Have you heard of a water taxi 
service?” 
 
CONCLUSION: BECOMING MULTIPLE 
Rather than focusing on the European border as a whole, this paper has 
sought to put assemblage theory to work in order to unpack a single 
‘border assemblage’: the Guardia Civil’s SIVE border surveillance system. 
Specifically my aims were to question how the various human and machine 
elements of SIVE combine to form a totalising vision over the borderspace 
and perform the border, as well as determine the humanitarian effects of 
this surveillance. I have shown that SIVE sometimes acts as a ‘humanitarian’ 
border control system and that its vision is susceptible to ‘blinks’ and 
rebellions. Yet what is important here is why the system is susceptible and 
only how it oscillates between enacting the border beyond the limits of 
territory and becoming a tool for search and rescue. Moreover, in stating 
my aims as I have done above, I have made three mistakes. In this 
concluding, therefore, section I will set out what these errors are, how they 
have been negated in the above analysis and reflect upon how they might 
inform border studies and critical work on security and surveillance more 
broadly. 
Firstly, there is no single SIVE assemblage of which we can speak, rather 
it is multiple (see Mol 2002). As Sohn (2015, 184) highlights, “a wall 
circumscribing a territory may signify a protection against external dangers 
for some, an obstacle or a symbol of political oppression for others, a 
scene for artistic expression (e.g. a graffiti board) for others”. Moreover, 
multiple ontologies of thought can coexist simultaneously in the performances 
of the border (Steinberg and Peters 2015). While the images produced by 
the Guardia Civil (2008) in their promotional material concerning SIVE 
perform it as being an all-seeing, pervasive system that functions through 
the perfect cooperation between man and machine, the everyday realities 
for the border guards tell a different story; one in which they must wrestle 
with dead pixels, cameras that occasionally fail and ‘muted’ spaces. Neither 
of these performed versions of SIVE is more real than the other, rather 
they simply coexist (Law and Urry 2004). While the first is performed 
towards EU decision-makers and other border agencies, the second exerts 
power upon migrants at the territorial borders of Spain. Indeed as Kaplan 
(2006) argues in the context the US’ World War II military campaign, 
although the need to achieve precision bombing was not supported by 
evidence, this did not stop the bombardier becoming a heroic figure in 
popular culture or reduce the number of industries “pressed into the quest 
for high-tech solutions to the perceived need for precision.”  
Even the everyday realities of what SIVE is and how it performs the 
border, however, vary to such a degree across time and space that yet 
more fragmentations of SIVE come into being. While SIVE functioned in 
Ceuta to perform the border by alerting the Moroccan navy to migrant 
boats still within Moroccan waters, SIVE in Algeciras is predominantly 
equipped for targeting speedboats carrying drugs and initiating Search and 
Rescue operations for migrant boats that have already made it into Spanish 
waters. The multiplicities of SIVE extend further still, however, as the ways 
in which the system performs its surveillance is formed by the variations 
in the skills of the human border guards operating the machines. In other 
words, SIVE is as multiple as the unique pairs of eyes that ‘see’ through 
it (see Williams 2011; Law 2002). This paper, therefore, calls for more 
attentiveness to the multiplicities of not just the border as a whole, but 
also the various systems of control that perform it and to think through 
how they co-exist, silence each other and influence both policy and the 
unfolding of everyday geopolitics.  
The second error originates from the misplaced assumption that I would be 
able to isolate SIVE and the actors that comprise it from other actors and 
assemblages present within the borderspace. Or that I should want to. 
Considering SIVE was designed to provide marine surveillance, for example, 
this article has focused heavily on the challenges posed by the rocky 
environment that surrounds the border fences of Ceuta for the border guards 
in the mobile búhos. While these challenges would be written out of 
analyses focused solely on the ‘formal performances’ of SIVE, here they 
tell a vital story concerning the everyday performance of the border. Indeed 
the mobile búhos play an important part in the surveillance of the marine 
border around Ceuta (especially near Benzú where there is no radar 
coverage), yet the guards’ tasks in these surveillance stations are inhibited 
by the need to simultaneously monitor the terrain around the fences. 
Meanwhile, in Algeciras, monitoring the SIVE cameras is only one of the 
guards’ many daily duties; all of which take up time and remove eyes 
from the not-so-ever-vigilant machines. In terms of identifying the cracks and 
fissures within surveillance systems (Walters 2011; Pötzsch 2015), therefore, 
assemblage theory finds them in the moments and spaces where actors 
are simultaneously committed to numerous assemblages. In the case of 
SIVE, this limit is accentuated by the need for speed which drives the 
performance of the border through the swift interactions between machines, 
Spanish border guards and Moroccan navy. Yet this requires all of these 
actors to cooperate at all times (an issue discussed below). This inability 
of actors to fully commit to SIVE, therefore, poses questions for further 
study of other surveillance and military systems. In particular, it raises the 
importance of foregrounding both the lived and environmental contexts in 
which security and military actors are situated and how these inhibit or 
alter everyday performances of (in)security and warfare.  
The third error comes from referring to SIVE as ‘the Guardia Civil’s border 
assemblage’. Doing so implies full control over the assemblage by one 
particular actor, as opposed to the distribution of power that was discussed 
previously. This is of course not to say that power is distributed equally 
amongst the actors involved, yet the system is nevertheless susceptible to 
various forms of rebellion or unpredictability. Specifically this paper has 
focused on the ways in which the camera recordings in both Lanzarote 
and at El Tarajal have been used by pressure groups to accuse the 
Guardia Civil of wrongdoings. Although the Tarajal case brought against the 
Guardia Civil has now been rejected twice by the Spanish courts,9 
nevertheless the footage showing Guardia Civil firing around 145 rubber 
bullets (made visible by tell-tale splashes) and 5 gas canisters at 
swimming/drowning migrants in both Spanish and Moroccan waters has 
caused widespread media interest and outrage in Spain.10 Similar to the 
#NotABugSplat campaign,11 therefore, hyper-visibility (generated in part through 
technologies of surveillance) is being utilised as a resistance tactic. To talk 
of the border assemblage as being the Guardia Civil’s to control, moreover, 
is to negate the roles played by the Moroccan navy and the Salvamento 
Marítimo in the ways in which the marine border is performed. While the 
cooperation with the Salvamento Marítimo gives SIVE legitimacy as a border 
control technology that saves lives at sea, it is only with the help of the 
Moroccan navy that that the border assemblage prevents migrants from 
entering Spanish waters. Finally, asserting such primacy to the Guardia Civil 
in the production of the borderspace is to obscure its volatility. As Andersson 
(2016) has previously shown concerning the fortification of the border fences, 
for example, the introduction of new technologies can have unpredictable 
effects not only on the way the border is managed but also in how it is 
encountered and resisted by those on the move. In this case, the current 
reaction to SIVE by the migrants has been to increase their vulnerability 
due to the belief that ‘captains’ will be prosecuted. There is no telling, 
therefore, how the border might change in the near future. While the 
Guardia Civil’s literature on SIVE suggests a near total control over the 
borderspace granted through SIVE’s vision capabilities, the border guards on 
the ground know that that the status quo could shift at any time. In other 
words, an important challenge in future work on borders and surveillance 
will be to further follow the actors ‘on the ground’ in order to determine 
the extent of surveillance assemblages’ (overlapping) networks such that 
potential cracks might be found. It is the ‘little things’ (Thrift 2000) which 
force the God’s Eye to blink… and it is in the blink of an eye that the 
borderspace can change.  
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